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The matter before the Court relates to the construction of the
following provision (the "Subject Paragraph") of the agreement
between the Appellants, Julie weaver and Catherine Palmer, and the
Appellee, Brite Music Enterprises, Inc. ("Brite").
As vou continue to exceed 1200 points per
month, the increasing carry-over points may
accumulate for as long as you desire; however,
each increment of 5,000 carry-over points is
redeemable for a check from Brite for $100.
Redeeming points in this manner does not
affect your life-time point accumulation or
the benefits you may eventually derive
therefrom, (emphasis added by Appellants)
The question to be answered by this Court is; did the trial court
commit error by deciding, as a matter of law, who had the right to
redeem the carry-over points?
The question of who had the redemption right is central to
this case on appeal. The Appellate Court may answer this question
4

as a matter of law, if it determines that the Subject Provision is
unambiguous; or, if the Court determines that the provision is
uncertain or ambiguous, the Court should remand this question of
law and fact to a jury to properly determine who had the right to
redeem the carry-over points.
Because this matter was decided at the trial court on a Motion
for Directed Verdict, the Appellate Court should give no deference
to the factual findings or legal conclusions of the trial court.
Canfield v. Albertsons, 841 P.2d 1224 (Ut. App. 1992).
POINT I
ASSUMING THAT THE CONTRACTUAL PROVISION AT
ISSUE IS UNAMBIGUOUS, THE TRIAL COURT FAILED
TO INTERPRET THE CONTRACT SO AS TO HARMONIZE
ALL OF ITS PROVISIONS. THE APPEALS COURT IS
TO GIVE NO DEFERENCE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S
INTERPRETATION AND THE APPEALS COURT IS TO
CONSTRUE THE CONTRACTUAL PROVISION AT ISSUE IN
LIGHT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION
APPLICABLE
TO
UNAMBIGUOUS
CONTRACTUAL
PROVISIONS.
Both in the statement of Brite's first argument, and in its
conclusion, counsel for Brite states that Appellants have failed to
carry their burden of proof. Burden of proof is a factual analysis
that cannot be determined on a Motion for Directed Verdict, if any
evidence is presented in opposition thereto.

Although a trial

court can interpret an ambiguous contract as a matter of law, and
thereby resolve a dispute, the trial court cannot take a factual
issue (requiring a burden of proof analysis), away from a jury on
a Motion for Directed Verdict.

5

In this Court's recent decision of Klienert v. Kimball
Elevator Company, 1995 WL 613775, 275 Utah adv. Rep. 44, (Ut. App.
10/19/95), this Court held that:
On appeal from a directed verdict, 'we must
examine the evidence in the light most
favorable to the losing party, and if there is
a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the
inferences to be drawn therefrom that would
support a judgment in favor of the losing
party, the directed verdict cannot be
sustained.'
Gourdin v. Sharon's Cultural
Educ. Rec. Ass'n. , 845 p.2d 242, 243 (Utah
1992) (quoting Graystone Pines, 652 P. 2d at
898) . Where there is any evidence that raises
a question of material fact, no matter how
improbable the evidence may appear, judgment
as a matter of law is improper. See Hill v.
Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P. 2d 241, 246
(Utah 1992). (emphasis added)
The Brief of the Appellee is directed against the use of
the principles of construction that relate to ambiguous provisions
of a contract.
that

are

Brite disregards the principles of construction

applicable

ambiguous.

to

contractual

provisions

that

are not

This portion of the Appellants' Reply Brief will

address the construction of an unambiguous provision.
The Appellants and Brite have both made reference to the fact
that there are three logical possibilities for the construction of
the subject language (Appellants' Brief at p. 28,. Appellee's Brief
at p. 13), these are: (1) that only the sales representatives can
exercise

the

redemption

provision;

(2) that

both

the

sales

representatives and Brite can exercise the redemption provision; or
(3) that only Brite can exercise the redemption provision.

To

determine that the Subject Paragraph is not ambiguous, it is
6

necessary to conclude, as a matter of law, that one of the three
possibilities is the proper construction.
In order for this Court to find that the provision is not
ambiguous, it must find within the four corners of the Subject
Paragraph something that establishes who had the right to exercise
the redemption provision.
Because the party who may redeem the carry-over points is not
expressly identified in the second sentence of the paragraph in
question, the only

analysis that

is helpful to making this

determination is one of harmonizing the subject paragraph as a
whole, and giving effect to all of its terms.

The Utah Supreme

Court, in speaking of unambiguous contractual provisions which may
be interpreted as a matter of law, stated in the case of Buehner
Block v. UWC Associates, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988), that:
[t]he interpretation of a written contract may
be a question of law determined by the words
in the agreement. In this regard, a cardinal
rule in construing such a contract is to give
effect to the intentions of the parties, and
if possible, these intentions should be
gleaned from an examination of the text of the
contract itself.
Additionally,
it is
axiomatic
that
a
contract
should
be
interpretedi so as to harmonize all of its
provisions and all of its terms, and all of
its terms should be criven effect if it is
possible to do so. (emphasis added)
It is compelling that the antecedent of every other phrase in
the paragraph refers exclusively to the sales representative by the
use of the pronouns "you" or "your".

There is nothing in the

language that possibly inserts the notion that Brite had the right
to exercise the redemption provision, or any other right in the
7

Subject Paragraph. The only reference to Brite is to indicate that
Brite is the source of the funds for the redemption of the carryover points, if the person having the right to redeem exercises
such right.
The fact that Brite is the source of the funds is totally
unhelpful in answering the question of who had the right to
exercise the redemption of the points. The fact that Brite was the
source of the funds is completely consistent with the conclusion
that the sales representative alone had the right to redeem the
carry-over points, which Brite would pay for.

As the sales

representative continued "to exceed 1,200 points per month" and as
the sales representative chose, in the alternative, to accumulate
those points "for as long as you
desire",

the

redemption

provision

[the sales representative]
merely

provided

the

sales

representative with the option to redeem for cash instead of
continuing to accumulate his or her carry-over points.
The second compelling argument based upon the objective of
harmonizing, and giving effect to, all of the provisions of the
paragraph

is

the

expressly

stated

concept

that

the

sales

representative could accumulate the carry-over points for as long
as the sales representative desired. This clearly stated right of
the sales representative is contained in the first part of the
single sentence describing the accumulation and redemption of the
carry-over points.

The sentence helps us to convincingly answer

the question; "Who can redeem the points?"

8

It is logically inconsistent, and would totally disregard the
notion of harmonizing all portions of this single sentence, to say
that Brite could

exercise the redemption provision when the

contractual term clearly says that the sales representatives could
accumulate the points for as long as they wanted to. Assuming that
the trial court's construction of this provision is correct, Brite
gave an unfettered right to the sales representative to accumulate
carry-over points indefinitely, then took that right away in the
very same breath.
When construed in the light most favorable to the Appellants,
and construed in a manner to harmonize and give effect to the
entire contractual provision, the Appeals Court should determine
that the carry-over point redemption provision could only be
exercised by the Appellant sales representatives.
POINT II
BY FAILING TO IDENTIFY WITH CERTAINTY THE
PARTY WHO CAN EXERCISE THE CARRY-OVER POINT
REDEMPTION PROVISION OF THE CONTRACT, BRITE
HAS RENDERED THE PARAGRAPH UNCERTAIN AND
AMBIGUOUS. THE CONTRACTUAL PROVISION AT ISSUE
MUST THEN BE INTERPRETED IN LIGHT OF THE
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION APPLICABLE
TO UNCERTAIN OR AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT PROVISION.
Brite argues in its Brief that several of the principles of
construction urged by the Appellants are not applicable in this
matter, because the trial court determined
Paragraph was unambiguous.

that the Subject

As stated above, this Court can make

its own determination regarding this conclusion without giving
deference to the determination of the trial court.

If, however,

the identity of the person who can exercise the redemption clause
9

is at all uncertain or ambiguous,

each of the legal principles

referred to herein are applicable.
With regard to the ambiguity of this provision, Brite/s own
counsel acknowledges the uncertainty.

During the examination of

Mr. Vassel1 at trial, the following discussion took place (Vassel
p. 52). The questions are by Brite's counsel:
Q
I want to clarify that we are not talking about
accumulating points here. We are talking about redeeming
those points?
A

Okay.

Q
Clearly, and I have no problem with the fact that a
marketing associate [i.e. the sales representative] can
elect to redeem if they choose to, right?
A

Right.

Q
Is there anything in this that says that the company
cannot redeem also?
A

Doesn't say either way.

Q
Right. Just says they [the carry-over points] can
be redeemed, doesn't it? (emphasis added)
Since it "doesn't say either way" whether or not Brite has the
right to redeem the carry-over points, it is entirely appropriate
for the Appellate

Court to determine that the provision

is

uncertain or ambiguous.
A determination of ambiguity is particularly appropriate when
there is uncertainty as to which party to a contract is empowered
with a specific right. A case in point is that of Cruz v. Molina,

1

Mr. Vassel was the former executive vice president of Brite.
10

788 F.Supp. 122, 124 (D. Puerto Rico 1992).

A copy of the case is

fl

included as Exhibit

B" in the Addendum to this Reply Brief.

tle Cruz case, a written lease gave a right of termination
on..

to

. t^e p a r t ^ e s ^

j^.w a s

u n c xea:t: jr

1: lowever, which party' had

the right to exercise the termination provision.

Although the

lease was i i I the Spanish language, the principle applied in the
case hhi'tl not.hmq tn tin with tin1 lanqikiq*1 iirii wh i rh the lease was
written.

The court, however, determined that the provision was

ambiguous, and stated as follows:
The clause is ambiguous because it is unclear
who has the right to terminate upon advance
notice, (emphasis added)
In construing the ambiguous provision now before this Court,

the scrivener of t

document; (b) what the parol evidence was

regarding the answer to the question of who had the right to
< .-

•

redempt ion pi: ov i s i on; a nd

(c) wl iat th e coi i:i : s e o f

dealing had been between the parties for more than eight years with
regard to this provision.

In fact, this testimony was received by

the tr la] court and heard by the jury, without objection by counsel
for Brite.
Based upon this testimony, and the uncertainty as to the
cei iti: al i ssue of this matter, it was error for the trial court to
grant the Motion for Directed Verdict and remove these factual
issues from the consideration of the jur) .
The evidence was clear that the sole scrivener of the document
was Brite and its agents (Brady p. 10, lines 8-16; quoted at page
•

".

•"'

'

.

"

.

•.'

.

.

l

i

24 of Appellants' original Brief).

Because of the uncertainty as

to who had the right to exercise the redemption provision, and the
principle of law that the contract is to be interpreted against the
scrivener, Abbott v. Christensen, 660 P.2d, 254, 257 (Utah 1983),
the question of the interpretation of the contract should have been
submitted to the jury, with a proper instruction regarding this
principle of construction.
Extensive testimony was also introduced by the Appellants,
including

testimony

of

admissions

made

by

Brite's

executive

officers, that only the sales representatives had the right to
exercise the redemption provision (Palmer pp. 31-33; p. 86, lines
9-12; p. 90, lines 2-3; Vassel p. 39; and see the text of Catherine
Palmer's testimony as quoted at pages 39 and 40 of the original
Brief of the Appellants).
This parol evidence, and other testimony given at the trial,
supported a long-standing course of dealing between the parties
that only the sales representatives were entitled to exercise the
redemption provision (Palmer p. 86, lines 9-12; p. 90, lines 2-3).
Further, the purpose of the carry-over points should be
considered in harmonizing the language of the provision.

The

testimony received at trial regarding the purpose of the carry-over
points was that the points were to be used to maintain the highest
compensation level, at times when a sales representative devoted
less time to personal sales activity. This use included retirement
(Vassel P. 22, lines 9-13), maternity leave (Brady p. 18), sick
leave (Brady p. 19), etc.
12

•- The" former Hxprutivc vii-p pipsidonl of Hr i t *-j explained these
purposes

large sales meetings of 75 to 200 sales representatives

/arious states.

At page 2 3 of his testimony, Mr. Vassel said

his d i.sruss i emu with sd 1 es repres
This month I will work hard, I will sell and
sponsor and I will get points for both, but
next month if I'm sick or next month if I,
even though my business efforts don't hit
1,200, the company permits me to take the
difference and get up to that 1,200 level.'
And so, I mean, it was a marvelous plan and we
openly extolled it, and we went around saying,
look at Julie Weaver, look at Catherine
Palmer, look at Nedra. These people have one
or two or three years where they literally
could retire or have a baby or whatever and
the carryover points were still there for
them.
These

maiiiis

should

have

been 'properly submitted

to the

jurors to consider the inconsistency of stating that, on the one
hand,

the

carry-over

points

could

be

representative for (a) years of retirement

accumulated

could

exercise

the

redemptio

a

sales

(h\ months of maternity

leave, or (c) years of church missionary service, if
who

by

»rovisi<

accumulated points for a few hundred dollars.

t was Brite
the

The redemption

payment would be totally inadequate to provide the benefits as
represented by the President ai id ot .her execut J ve offi cers of Br :i te.
Given three opportunities to explain such inconsistency, Mr. Brady2

2

A founder and the president of Brite (Brady i , r- and 6 ) .

could not reconcile such diametrically opposed notions.

At the

trial, Mr. Brady testified as follows:
Q
Now, if in drafting these terms that you've
indicated so far, Mr. Brady, if Brite Music could redeem
at will for $100, wouldn't that be incon — if the right
was in Brite to redeem for $100 wouldn't that be
inconsistent with the term 'as long as you desire?'
Wouldn't that be inconsistent?
A
I'm not sure I can answer that (Brady p. 29, lines
21-25, p. 30, lines 1-2).
Clearly, if Mr. Brady could not resolve this inconsistency,
this matter should have been submitted to the jury to determine the
proper meaning of the Subject Paragraph.

This is particularly the

case because Brite's Motion for a Directed Verdict must be judged
in the light most favorable to the party opposing the Motion.
Klienert v. Kimball Elevator Company, 1995 WL 613775, 275 Utah Adv.
Rep. 44, (Ut. App. 10/19/95)
Because the Subject Paragraph is ambiguous, the principles of
construction clearly compel submission of this matter to the jury,
and preclude the determination of this case on a Motion for
Directed Verdict.
The

only

other

legal

argument

of

Brite

regarding

the

interpretation of the ambiguous language is Brite's assertion at
page 14 of the Brief of Appellee that "course of dealing" are
"commercial transaction terms governed by Article II of the Uniform
Commercial Code".

Brite then states that the matter before the

Court is not a commercial transaction and that the application of
such concept is not appropriate.

14

This argument is without merit.

Appellants

acknowledge

(

Article

II

ol

the*

Uniform

.

U.C.A. 70A-2-102),

*

(see

which this case is not an example.
f

the portion
c

that

.

^

applicable

to

course

of

However,

dealing

is

i" i Article J i:

U.C.A. 70A-1-205(1) provides as follows:
A course of dealing is a sequence of previous
conduct between the parties to a particular
transaction which is fairly to be regarded as
establishing a common basis of understanding
for interpreting their expressions and other
conduct.
Additionally, Appellants note that the concept of using the
course of dealing between parties as a means of interpreting their
contracts is a principle used in all aspects of the law and is not
limited exclusively to the Uniform Commercial Code.

An example of

this is its application to contracts for services rendered, which
contracts are without the scope of the Uniform Commercial Code.
The application of this principle is found
St. B e n e d i c t s Hospital, 6 3 8 P. 2 c:i ] 3 9 0, ]

the case of Eie v.
:

) 81 )

The Eie case is based upon an agreement for services between
the hospital and individuals providing paramedic services in the
Ogden area. At page 1195 C)f i ts opi ni 01 1, tl: 11= Coiij : t :i nterpreted the
services contract in 1ight of the course of dealing of the parties,
and stated as follow:
Finally, the course of dealing of the parties
gives some indication of their intentions.
Throughout the entire time the agreement was
in force, the hospital reimbursed to plaintiff
90% of the bill. At no time did it pay a flat
$90 fee.
Furthermore, plaintiffs made no
protest
until
after
the
contractual
15

relationship was terminated in February 1977.
Though arguably clear on its face, where the
parties demonstrate by their actions that to
them the contract meant something quite
different, the intent of the parties will be
enforced, (emphasis added)
Based on the testimony given at trial on the three principles
of judicial construction discussed in this section, the proper
interpretation of the Subject Paragraph cannot be determined as a
matter of law on a Motion for Directed Verdict.
POINT III
THE APPELLANTS PROPERLY RAISED THE ISSUE OF
WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.
THE ISSUES OF WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL HAVE NOT
BEEN FIRST PRESENTED IN THIS MATTER ON APPEAL.
Attached as Exhibit MAlf in the Addendum to this Reply Brief is
a copy of the Appellants' Motion for a New Trial and to Amend the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which was filed with the
trial court (R. 697-699) .
Exhibit

"D"

and

This document was also attached as

incorporated

into

Appellants'

trial

court

Memorandum in support of its post-trial motions (R. 726-752) . The
fourth numbered paragraph of the Motion urges the trial court to
amend its findings to make them complete and address the matter of
estoppel and waiver.
The issues of estoppel and waiver should have been submitted
to the jury for the jurors' determination, because they were
factual issues that could not be determined as a matter of law.
The

submission

of

these

matters

to

the

jury

was

urged

by

Appellants' counsel on the second day of the trial as counsel was
arguing the Motion for Directed Verdict to the Court.
16

When the

trial

court asked Appellants' *

- -

i

counsel interrupted the argument to confirm that estoppel had not
been pled,

Counsel

argument

the

to

compi

for Appellants

jury."

stated

Appellants'

"that's

[estoppel]

rnunse I continued;

sesn't have to pi ead estoppel or waiver

a deficiency at all now" (K.

and

objection.

estoppel

had

it is not

bA),

Though perhaps not cti'tlulb, stated,
waiver

"The

been

submitted

nbumiriiil
to

the

I est In JH\
jury,

of

without

There is r > deficiency in pleadings when the issue has

been presented in •

.;: ,

• i P- •*. •-.<•.-

The matte i: was pi: operly

before the trial court and the jury, and the jury should have
properly

been

deter mi nati 01 1

instructed

on

these
••

issues

for

their

factual

' '

The case of Matter of Estate of Justheim, 824 P.2d 432 (Ut.
App 199J

cited b;, the Appellee, is distinguishable

matte

- lore tl le Appellate Court.

•

Ii i Justheim., the case had

not been decided on a motion for directed verdict.
in fact, been submitted to the jury.

from the

The case had,

There had been no :i nsti i :icti on

to tl :te jit] : > , ai id i ic argument to the court or jury on the issue of
estoppel before the matter was submitted to the jury.

As stated by

the Justheim Court, the estoppel theory was first ment ioned in the
post -Li" i a I motion nl I lie Appellants.
In the matter now before the Appellate Court, the issues of
waiver and estoppel were raised in the argument on I ho Motion for
Directed Verdict _ whi ] e the jury was waiting in the jury room
outside of the hearing of the court.
17

Counsel for Appellants argued

that the issues were to be properly submitted to the jury.
issues were

again

raised

in the

post-trial

motions

These
of

the

Appellants, all of which is timely before the submission of the
case to the jury.
Ample evidence was admitted at trial that officers of Brite
had

stated,

on

several

occasions, that

(a) only

the

sales

representatives had exercised the carry-over point redemption
provision,

and

(b) that

this

right

was

that

of

the

sales

representatives (Palmer p. 86, lines 9-15, and quoted at p. 39 of
Appellants' original Brief; Palmer pp. 31-3 3, quoting Mike Perry
and quoted at p. 46 of the Appellants' original Brief; Bruno Vassel
p. 39, and quoted at p. 41 of Appellants' original Brief).
This evidence and these admissions by
demonstrate that Brite was estopped

from denying

interpretation of the redemption provision.
position

that

it

had

that

someone

its own officers
the proper

Brite had waived any

other

than

the

representative could exercise the redemption provision.

sales
Whether

the admitted testimony was totally dispositive of the issue, is
irrelevant here.

In all events, such testimony should have been

submitted to the jury.
Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that
"when issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings". A matter is
tried by express or implied consent when testimony is admitted at

18

trial 01 1 the issues not raised I n the original pleadings, without
objection <

•;•-*• .1 ig counse,.

In the case of Zions First National Bank v. Rocky Mountain
Irrigation. Inc.,

P.2d 658, 663 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme

Court

:iidaf or y for the li lal ooniiri

evidence t^

to submit

on issues presented at trial when there was a

failure ?\ object t

evidence which was outside the scope of the
f,

till HE Coiii: t stated:

Our rules of civil procedure require
that the
pleadings be conformed to the evidence
presented at trial when no objection is made
to the introduction of such evidence. Utah
R.Civ.P 15(b); see Poulsen
v. Poulsen,
672
P.2d 97 (Utah 1983) (mandatory for trial court
to gr^nt leave to amend to conform,, to
evidence);

General

Ins.

Co.

V.

Carniecero

Dynasty
Corp.,
545 P. 2d 502, 505-06 (Utah
1976) (failure to object to evidence outside
scope of pleadings is implied consent to try
issue raised by such evidence) . The trial
court has no discretion to deny such an
amendment. General Ins. Co., 545 P. 2d at 506.
By not giving the proposed instructions on
common law fraud and attempted theft by
deception, the trial court failed to comply
with Rule 15(b). Furthermore, our case law
requires that the trial court instruct the
jury on each party's theory of the case so
long a£ it is supported by competent evidence,
(citations omitted, emphasis is that of the
Supreme Court)
It should b£ further noted that there is no requirement that
a party make a itiotion to amend Its pleadi nqs to conform, hi the
evidence

'he express or implied consent to the consideration of

an issue is sufficient for the presentation of the matter to a
jury# or for the issue to be the basi s « :)f a judgmei i, t: entered i i :i„ a
matter.
29

In the case of Eie v. St. Benedicts Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190,
1194

(Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court, citing other Utah

authorities, stated that Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure:
Further allows for an amendment to conform to
the proof after trail or even after judgment,
and indicates that if the ends of justice so
require, 'failure so to amend does not affect
the result of the trial of these issues.'
This idea is confirmed by Rule 54(c)(1),
U.R.C.P.: '[E]very final judgment shall grant
the relief to which the party in whose favor
it is rendered is entitled, even if the party
has not demanded
such relief
in his
pleadings.'
In the Zions Bank case supra, the Supreme Court held that the
trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the issues
admitted pursuant to the testimony presented at trial.

In the

matter now before the Appellate Court, the trial court erred in
failing to submit the case to the jury based upon the issues of
waiver and estoppel.
CONCLUSION
If the Appeals Court determines that the Subject Paragraph is
ambiguous, then this matter should be remanded to the trial court
for submission to a jury with proper instruction to construe the
Subject Paragraph in accordance with the principles of construction
of ambiguous documents. In such event, the jury should rightfully
determine the factual issues bearing on the construction of the
agreement of the parties.
Further, if this Court, in de novo consideration of this
matter, agrees that the issue of waiver and estoppel were properly
20

raised and argued to the trial court then, under the standard set
forth in the Kleinert case, supra. there is clearly sufficient
testimony of waiver and estoppel that would preclude the granting
of a Motion for Directed Verdict by the trial court•

In such

event, the jury should rightfully determine the factual issues
relating to waiver and estoppel, and this matter should be remanded
for their consideration.
If this Court determines, however, that the Subject Paragraph
is unambiguous, then the Appeals Court should analyze de novo, the
Subject Paragraph and interpret the redemption provision in light
of the principles of contract construction established by this
Court.

These principles provide that a contract

should be

interpreted so as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its
terms.

Based upon the argument set forth in Point I of this Reply

Brief, Appellants submit that the answer to the question; "Who can
redeem

the

carry-over

points?"

is

that

only

the

sales

representatives have this redemption right.
If the Appeals Court determines, as matter of law, that only
the

sales representatives

can

exercise

the

carry-over

point

redemption provision, then the trial court erred, and this matter
should be remanded to the trial court with instructions that only
Weaver and Palmer are able to exercise the redemption provision.
Then the balance of the case, relating to the breach of the

21

contract by Brite and the damages suffered by the Appellants,
should be submitted to the jury.

x£

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this xlU"V

day of February, 1996.

i

JRUCE L. DIBB
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN,
DIBB & JACKSON

Mailing Certificate

I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing
Reply of Appellants and attached Addendum to the counsel for the
Appellee by placing

true copies thereof in an envelope addressed

to:
Rick J. Sutherland
P.O. Box 770
Park City, Utah 84060
postage prepaid, this Qvk^K day of February, 1 9 9 6 .

RPLBRF.436

22

ADDENDUM

23

Exhibit A

FILED
^5FF.3-6 FM 3*-35

THOMAS A. DUFFIN (927)
BRUCE L. DIBB (0879)
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
!
Attorneys for Plaintiff
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 5 3 1 - 6 6 0 0

. -ISTTSCT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JULIE WEAVER and
CATHERINE PALMER
Plaintiffs,

MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
AND TO AMEND THE FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
BRITE MUSIC ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 9 1 0 9 3 1 2 4 C N
Judge Iwasaki

Pursuant to Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, New trials;
amendments of Judgment, and more particularly pursuant to (a) Grounds, (6) and (7),
the Plaintiffs, Julie Weaver and Catherine Palmer, move the Court to amend the
findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment entered on or about January 2 7 ,
1995, and direct the entry of a new judgment as follows:
1.

That the Plaintiffs, Julie Weaver and Catherine Palmer, entered into

a Sales Agreement with Defendant, Brite Music, Exhibit D7, in the years 1982 and
1983, which was drafted and prepared by Defendant, and provides for additional
compensation to Plaintiffs in the form of carry-over points. The following language
of the Brite Sales Agreement provided as follows:

-

K, \s \s i)

*

-2-

" As you continue to exceed 1200 points per month, the increasing
carry-over points may accumulate for as long as you desire; however,
each increment of 5,000 carry-over points is redeemable for a check
from Brite for $100. Redeeming points in this manner does not affect
your life-time point accumulation or the benefits you may eventually
derive therefrom."
2.

The Court finds as a matter of law that the said language in the

sales agreement was clear and unambiguous, and gave the right to Brite Music
Enterprises, Inc., the Defendant, to redeem from Plaintiffs for $ 100 each 5 , 0 0 0 carryover points.
3.

The Court finds as a matter of law that the language in the sales

agreement is clearly ambiguous and that a proper finding of fact should be made by
the jury as to the meaning of the ambiguous term by the jury making a determination
by the representations of the Defendant's agents, the intent of the parties and such
other and further evidence that will be necessary to give meaning to the terms of the
agreement.
4%

That at no time, as a matter of law, did the Defendant, Brite Music,

by and through its agents, waive, alter, amend or make an independent agreement,
or is Defendant estopped from denying, by its actions or its conduct, that the Plaintiffs
had the sole right to exercise the redemption option.
Pursuant to the above-entitled matter, the Plaintiffs have ordered a
transcript of the trial and therefore, respectfully request the Court to allow sufficient
time for the court reporter to transcribe and testimony and then Plaintiffs will file a
Memorandum in support of the Motion to amend the judgment within ten days after

-3-

the transcript is furnished in the above matter.
Dated this

^3

day of February, 1995.
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON

<rf^?<r?/*4-S A j > ^ 4
JFhohnas A. Duffin
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Motion to the
following parties by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Rick J. Sutherland
Attorney for Defendant
P.O. Box 770
Park City, Utah 84060
postage prepaid, this —S day of February, 1995.
7
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Jorge CRUZ, Plaintiff,
v.
Norberto MOLINA, Defendant.

Under Puerto Rico law, abandonment of
leasehold requires both act and intention of
relinquishing premises absolutely.

Civ. No. 89-432 (PG).

[3] LANDLORD AND TENANT <&* 130(2)
233kl30(2)
By locking tenant out of the leasehold,
landlord breached both his obligation under
Puerto Rico law to maintain tenant in
peaceful enjoyment of leasehold and his
obligation not to deprive tenant of leasehold
without assistance of law, but tenant
sustained no damages where he was in the
process of moving out.

United States District Court,
D. Puerto Rico.
March 27, 1992.
Tenant brought suit seeking damages for
landlord's breach of lease agreement and
negligence with regard to tenant's belongings.
Landlord counterclaimed seeking recovery for
breach of contract, damages to property,
attorney fees and slander. The District Court,
Gene Carter, Chief Judge, sitting by
designation, held that: (1) tenant sustained no
damage from being excluded from the
leasehold; (2) tenant was not entitled to
reimbursement for money spent prior to
execution of lease on alterations to house; (3)
even if landlord was negligent in his care of
tenant's belongings on the property, tenant
failed to prove damages; (4) tenant was not
entitled to damages for severe mental anguish
allegedly suffered when landlord locked him
out; (5) tenant was obligated to continue
paying rent until landlord excluded him from
the property; (6) tenant was responsible for
extermination expenses; and (7) landlord was
not entitled to damages for mental anguish
and emotional distress caused by tenant's
lawsuit and destruction of landlord's property.

[3] LANDLORD AND TENANT <S=> 130(4)
233kl30(4)
By locking tenant out of the leasehold,
landlord breached both his obligation under
Puerto Rico law to maintain tenant in
peaceful eiyoyment of leasehold and his
obligation not to deprive tenant of leasehold
without assistance of law, but tenant
sustained no damages where he was in the
process of moving out.
[3] LANDLORD AND TENANT <S=* 275
233k275
By locking tenant out of the leasehold,
landlord breached both his obligation under
Puerto Rico law to maintain tenant in
peaceful enjoyment of leasehold and his
obligation not to deprive tenant of leasehold
without assistance of law, but tenant
sustained no damages where he was in the
process of moving out.

Ordered accordingly.
[1] LANDLORD AND TENANT <S=* 94(6)
233k94(6)
Although notice had been given that tenant
planned to leave the premises at some
indeterminate time after Christmas, lease had
not terminated under Puerto Rico law, where
landlord had asked tenant to inform him
before tenant left the property and no such
notification was given, and although tenant
was in the process of moving out, he had not
moved out.
[2] LANDLORD AND TENANT <®^ 110(1)
233kll(Kl)

[4] LANDLORD AND TENANT <£=> 152(11)
233kl52(ll)
Under Puerto Rico law, tenant was not
entitled to reimbursement for money spent on
alterations to house prior to execution of lease,
absent adequate proof of how much tenant
spent on repairs.
[5] LANDLORD AND TENANT <S^ 161(3)
233kl61(3)
Even if landlord was negligent, under Puerto
Rico law, in his care of tenant's belongings on
the property, tenant failed to prove damages.
[6] DAMAGES <S=> 49.10

Copr. e West 1996 No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works
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115k49.10
Under Puerto Rico law, tenant was not
entitled to damages for severe mental anguish
allegedly suffered when landlord locked him
out of the property, absent showing that
tenant's health, welfare and happiness were
affected in an appreciable manner.
[7] LANDLORD AND TENANT <&* 190(1)
233kl90(l)
Under Puerto Rico law, tenant was obligated
to continue paying rent until landlord
excluded him from the property. 31 L.P.R.A.
§ 4052.
[8] LANDLORD AND TENANT <®^ 55(1)
233k55(l)
Under Puerto Rico law, tenant was liable for
extermination expenses incurred by landlord
due to infestation caused by tenant leaving
the house dirty. 31 L.P.R.A. § 4060.
[9]
FEDERAL
CIVIL
PROCEDURE
<§=> 2742.5
170Ak2742.5
Issue of whether landlord was entitled to
attorney fees under clause in contract
requiring tenant to pay reasonable expenses
arising out of legal action due to breach of
contract was waived, where landlord presented
no evidence on this claim and had not
addressed it in his brief.
[10] DAMAGES <S=* 49.10
115k49.10
Landlord did not make showing of mental
distress caused by tenant's lawsuit and
destruction of landlord's property adequate to
require compensation in damages under
Puerto Rico law.
[10] DAMAGES &* 55
115k55
Landlord did not make showing of mental
distress caused by tenant's lawsuit and
destruction of landlord's property adequate to
require compensation in damages under
Puerto Rico law.
[11] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE <S=* 2011
170Ak2011
Counterclaim for slander was waived, where
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defendant presented no evidence or argument
on such counterclaim.
•123 Raul Barrera Morales, Santurce, P.R.,
for plaintiff.
Ivan Duarte Sierra, Aida Tolentino Medina,
Bayamon, PR., for defendant.
OPINION
GENE CARTER, Chief Judge. [FN1]
FNl. District of Maine, sitting by designation in the
District of Puerto Rico.

In this diversity action brought under
Puerto Rican law, Plaintiff seeks recovery for
damages allegedly caused by Defendant's
breach of a lease agreement and by
Defendant's negligence with regard to
Plaintiffs belongings.
Defendant has
counterclaimed seeking recovery for breach of
contract, damage to the property, attorney's
fees, and slander. Both parties have claimed
damages for mental distress. The Court
conducted a bench trial on February 3-5, 1992.
The Court finds the following facts.
On October 8, 1987, Plaintiff and Defendant
entered into a lease agreement under which
Plaintiff would rent Defendant's house in the
Canovanillas ward of Carolina. Defendant
was a resident of New York. The lease
agreement was evidenced in part by a written
document submitted in evidence as Jt.Ex. I. It
is clear from all the testimony, [FN2] however,
that other oral terms were agreed to by the
parties.
FN2. Under Puerto Rican law, "[i]f the terms of a
contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the
intentions of the contracting parties, the literal sense
of its stipulations shall be observed. If the words
should appear contrary to the evident intention of
the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail."
31 L.P.R.A. § 3471. The document here does not
indicate that it contains all the terms of the
agreement, and the testimony of both parties makes
clear that there were other terms included in the
agreement.
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Under the contract Plaintiff agreed to pay
Defendant $150 dollars a month for the term
of the lease, which was to end on June 30,
1988. The rent was payable in advance
monthly, beginning on October 15,1987. Bills
for electricity, water, minor repairs and
maintenance of the property were to be paid
by Plaintiff, the lessee. Plaintiff also was
charged with taking care of the property with
the necessary zeal and with responsibility for
damage to the property due to his negligence.
For violation of the terms of the lease by
Plaintiff, Defendant, the lessor, could
terminate the lease and demand vacation of
the premises and compensation for damages,
all pursuant to law. Jt.Ex. I.

testified that he paid about $1000 for
materials for this work. Defendant admits
that Plaintiff paid for some materials,
estimating the cost to Plaintiff at $48.
Defendant testified that he did not know if
certain doors used belonged to Plaintiff. The
Court finds that although Plaintiff incurred
some indeterminate expense for materials
used to renovate the house before the lease
took effect, it seems unlikely that Plaintiff
would have incurred expenses of $1000 for a
leasehold which, when it came into existence,
was for less than a year. There is no evidence
of any agreement between the parties or
promise by the Defendant to the effect that he
would pay for such repairs.

The lease contains an ambiguous phrase
concerning termination before its expiration
date. [FN3] The parties' testimony and the
•124 documents in evidence make clear that
the parties intended that the lessee, Plaintiff,
be able to terminate in advance of the lease's
expiration date. Jt.Exs. HI and IV; see also
infra. The most important oral term agreed
upon by the parties was that one of the
bedrooms of the house would be available to
Defendant for his use when he came to Puerto
Rico from New York.

In November, 1987 Plaintiff submitted
notice by letter that he intended to begin
looking for another place to live "after the
Christmas holidays." Jt.Ex. IH. He testified
that the letter was intended to comply with
the requirement of notifying Defendant. Id.
Defendant's letter in response, Jt.Ex. IV,
dated November 1987, shows that he joined in
Plaintiffs interpretation.
Rather than
complaining that Plaintiff was trying to
terminate illegally, Defendant asked Plaintiff
in a postscript to the letter to please inform
Defendant "before you leave the property."
Id. Defendant never heard from Plaintiff that
he was leaving the property.

FN3. Paragraph J of the Spanish version of the
lease mistakenly states that the "arrendadora" must
notify the "arrendadora" one month in advance if he
wishes to terminate the lease before its expiration
date. Although the official translation translates the
first "arrendadora" in paragraph J as lessor and the
second as lessee, a different term "arrendataria" or
"arrendatario" has been used on all other occasions
in the lease to designate the lessee. The Court
finds, therefore, that the translation is in error. The
clause is ambiguous because it is unclear who has
the right to terminate upon advance notice.

Plaintiff entered the leasehold in October
I§87.
He paid Defendant $300, which
comprised the first month's rent and a security
deposit. Prior to his taking possession, certain
alterations and repairs had been made to the
house.
Among other things three small
bedrooms had been reconfigured to make two
larger bedrooms with closets, and washbasins
and a medicine cabinet were added. Plaintiff
Copr. e West 1996 No clai

Defendant returned to Puerto Rico early on
the morning of January 27, 1988 to check on
his property. He tried to gain admittance to
his house then and again at 7 a.m. without
success. Finally, at around 5 p.m. he obtained
the key to the gate from neighbor David
Loperena. Defendant spent a short time in
the house, and then left to stay with friends,
having changed the padlock on the gate to the
fence which surrounds the property. Although
Defendant testified that he did not change the
padlock until February 28, when he left for
New York, the Court does not believe him on
this point.
Plaintiff testified quite credibly that he
arrived at the house in the early evening of
January 27 and could not open the gate. The
Court credits this testimony because it is
to orig. U.S. govt, works
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corroborated by the testimony of another
witness, David Loperena, [FN4] and by a
complaint filed in court by Plaintiff. PX 6.
David Loperena testified that Defendant said
he was going to change the locks to keep
Plaintiff from getting the rest of his things out
because Plaintiff had to answer to him for not
paying the electric bill. Plaintiff later came to
Loperena's house saying he had been locked
out. Although Loperena admitted he had been
drinking when Defendant came to his house to
get the key, the Court found his memory of
the events to be credible and detailed. On
February 23, 1988 prior to the date on which
Defendant admits changing the locks on the
house and going back to New York, Plaintiff
also filed a complaint in the Municipal Court
in Carolina in which he recited that he had
found himself locked out of his house.
FN4. Plaintiffs testimony was also corroborated by
that of Edwin Castro who was engaged to help
Plaintiff move.

When Defendant entered the house on
January 27th, he found that Plaintiff had
•125 removed some of his furniture, but that
there remained some furniture, clothing,
books, personal effects, and boxes of kitchen
utensils and food belonging to Plaintiff. The
furniture remaining included a locked file
cabinet, a dresser, a sofa, and a table and
chairs. Defendant testified that the house was
in shocking condition, that the dining room
table was covered with dust, garbage was
lying around, grapes were lying out on a table,
the stove was filthy and in deplorable
condition, window cranks were broken, the
lawn was rutted, and there were rats.
Defendant testified that from the condition
of the house, he thought Plaintiff had
abandoned it. The Court finds that that
conclusion was unwarranted.
Many of
Plaintiffs belongings and furniture were still
in the house. Although David Loperena's
mother told Defendant she had not seen
Plaintiff for a few days, Loperena testified
that he told Defendant that Plaintiff was in
the process of moving out and to let him go.
[FN5] Although Plaintiff testified that he was
still living in the house at the time Defendant
jrtOH)/^
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returned, the Court finds that he was not
occupying the premises, but was in the process
of moving out.
FN5. There was a conflict between the testimony of
Defendant and David Loperena. Defendant testified
that he did not speak to Loperena because Loperena
was drunk. Witness Rodolfo Ortiz, who went with
Defendant to Loperena's house, testified that he
does not recall if the two talked. Loperena admitted
he had been drinking when Defendant arrived to get
the key, but described in detail a conversation they
had had concerning, among other things,
nonpayment of the electric bill for Defendant's
house.
Because Defendant and Loperena had
dealings concerning Defendant's truck, about which
Defendant testified that he was very angry, the
Court finds it highly improbable that Defendant did
not speak to Loperena when he went to his house to
get the key after being in New York for several
months. The Court also found Loperena's version
of the conversation convincing because of the detail
provided and because it seems to make sense in the
context of what was then otherwise occurring.

Defendant testified that he spent about
$1000 putting the house back in order. He
states that he spent $300 to replace the stove,
$100 to replace the window cranks, about $700
for extermination services, and some money
for reseeding the grass. Photographs which
purportedly document the condition of the
house prior to Plaintiff's tenancy and as
Defendant found it in January 1988 were
admitted as DX 40-92. Plaintiff testified that
the photos represented as showing the house
before he moved in also show it as he left it
and that the photos showing slovenly
housekeeping and disarray do not represent
the house as he left it. He testified that he
never used the stove.
Defendant's testimony that the house was
messy and dirty on January 27 had the ring of
truth and was corroborated by the fact that
David Loperena testified that Defendant
wanted him to see the bad condition of the
house.
The Court believes Defendant's
testimony that the house had become infested
with roaches and rodents, requiring the
ministrations of an exterminator. Since the
house was in the possession of Plaintiff until
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Defendant arrived, the Court finds that
condition of the house was due to Plaintiffs
lack of care for it. The Court does not believe
that the photographs all represent the
condition of the house as Defendant found it,
however. For example, Defendant testified
that the photographs numbered 46, 47, 83, and
92 all show what he saw when he got to the
house. That is impossible since the stove is
pictured in the kitchen in two of the
photographs, DX 83 and 92, and outside on the
porch in another. DX 47. Clearly, someone
had moved the stove before some of the
pictures were taken. This lends some credence
to Plaintiffs testimony that the house as
depicted in the photographs was not as he had
left it.
After Plaintiff found that he could not get
into the house on January 27, he did not
return again to ask Defendant to let him
remove his belongings but rather sought to
initiate legal proceedings to gain admittance.
Defendant remained in the house throughout
most of February without hearing from
Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that he was afraid
of Defendant
because Defendant
had
threatened to pay to have Plaintiff's head
ripped off. David Loperena testified that the
threats were made in *126 his presence.
Defendant denies having made the threats.
On the 24th of February Plaintiff saw
Defendant at a local store and Defendant told
him he should remove his belongings from the
house by 6 p.m. that evening. Plaintiff did not
do so and persisted with his legal proceedings.
He testified that he did not want to go to the
house alone and that he had sought police
accompaniment, but that by the time he
arrived Defendant had left.
Plaintiff's attorney prepared an application
for a possessory injunction, but Plaintiff
decided not to file it because he did not want
to move into the house again.
Plaintiff
continued his other legal proceedings to
retrieve his belongings, and Defendant
returned to Puerto Rico at the end of March in
response to a summons.
Plaintiff and
Defendant met with a judge on April 8 and
arranged for Plaintiff to enter the house and
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get his remaining property. On April 15,
Plaintiff, his attorney, Castro, Defendant and
a few others met at the house. They entered
the house [FN6], Plaintiff and Defendant each
identified his property, and the attorney
detailed the contents of the house in a notarial
act. Jt.Ex. II. Plaintiff's clothing was found
in Defendant's bedroom, and Defendant's
clothing was found in Plaintiffs room.
Plaintiff stated that a twelve carat emerald,
$2500 to $3000 in cash, and "two pieces of
steel, eight feet long with their base" were
missing. He seeks recovery here for the
emerald and the cash.
FN 6. Plaintiff opened the gate and the house with
his keys. Although Plaintiff was able to enter in
April, the Court does not find that he was equally
able to enter the house on January 27. The locks
were padlocks and easily changeable, and the Court
finds that while on January 27 Defendant had put in
place on the gate a padlock which Plaintiff could
not open, he had at some time before the April 15
meeting of the parties and counsel on the premises
switched padlocks so Plaintiff could enter.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has not met
his burden of showing he left either an
emerald or any significant amount of cash in
the house. Plaintiff testified that he had left a
12 carat emerald, valued at $65,000, in the
pocket of his tuxedo in the closet of the house
he rented from Defendant.
The only
corroborating evidence was provided by
Plaintiff's attorney, Wilfredo Hcorelli, who
testified that at his initial interview with
Plaintiff, Plaintiff told him he could not get
into the house and he had left clothing and
some jewelry there, including an emerald.
Picorelli's notes of that meeting refer to
valuables and money, but not specifically to
an emerald. Ex. K.
Plaintiff may, at one time, have possessed
an emerald. A photograph of what could be
either an emerald or green glass was admitted
as an exhibit. Plaintiff also told an engaging
tale of how he had acquired the stone in the
photograph from a friend for whose hotel he
had provided free laundry service over a
period of years. Plaintiff further testified that
the emerald had been photographed for him
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by a photographer who usually documented
hair transplants. Even if the Court believed
that Plaintiff had an emerald and that it is
represented in the photograph, those facts
merely show that he had an emerald in 1980
or 1981. The record is notably devoid of any
evidence, other than Plaintiffs testimony,
showing that Plaintiff had an emerald in his
possession around the time he says it was lost.
While Plaintiff testified that he usually left
the emerald in his daughter's care and that he
had retrieved it from her possession to show to
David Loperena's mother, neither the
daughter nor Mrs. Loperena testified. In fact,
no one testified who had ever seen an emerald
in Plaintiff's possession This leads the Court
to believe that no one could testify to having
seen Plaintiff with an emerald around the
pertinent time. There was no evidence of any
insurance held for such a valuable item.
Moreover, Plaintiffs other behavior was also
not consonant with that of someone who is
concerned about a very valuable possession.
After Plaintiff gained access to the house and
asserted that the emerald and a large amount
of cash were missing, he did not report them
to the police as stolen items. Given the
asserted value of the emerald and the money,
it seems unlikely *127 that an owner would
have left them in the pocket of his tuxedo.
Moreover, the tuxedo seems an unlikely
storage place when Plaintiff had a locked file
cabinet on the premises.
Plaintiff also made only desultory attempts
to get whatever property might be in the
house. After the first rebuff at the locked
gate, he did not attempt to go to the house for
the whole month of February while Defendant
was in Puerto Rico. Rather, Plaintiff seemed
perfectly willing to let the court proceedings
he had initiated run their course. Although
he professed to be worried about alleged
threats made by Defendant against him, the
Court does not believe Plaintiffs testimony
that fear kept him from more actively seeking
the return of his property. It is conceivable
that Defendant used idle threatening
language in his anger about the condition of
the house; however, the Court does not
believe either from Plaintiffs demeanor and
.ciio^
#
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expression during his testimony or from his
conduct that Plaintiff interpreted Defendant's
words as serious threats. As both an attorney
and a mature man, Plaintiff would have
construed Defendant's angry language as the
posturing that it was.
Conclusions of Law
A. Plaintiffs Claims
The Court finds that on January 27, 1988,
when Defendant returned to Canovanillas
from New York, the lease between him and
Plaintiff was still in effect. Although the
lease provided for thirty-day advance notice of
termination, that clause is ambiguous, as
described above, and can be interpreted with
the aid of extrinsic evidence. The evidence
here shows that the parties intended that the
lessee should give at least 30 days notice to
lessor before terminating the lease.
As
discussed above Plaintiff and Defendant both
interpreted the clause as allowing Plaintiff to
terminate early, and both Plaintiffs notice
letter and Defendant's response to the notice
indicate that neither party considered the
lease to be terminated thirty days from the
date of the notice. [FN7]
FN7. In his brief Defendant appears to argue two
conflicting positions. First, he argues that the
termination became effective on December 15,
1987, thirty days after Plaintiffs notice was sent.
This is clearly not what was intended by the parties
since Plaintiff said he planned to begin looking
"after the Christmas holidays," and Defendant by
return letter acknowledged the notification.
Defendant also argues that the termination must
have occurred on December 31, 1987 because
every reasonable person knows that Christmas is
over on December 31. Again, this is not persuasive
since Plaintiffs letter said he would begin looking
for a new place after the holidays. Defendant
clearly accepted the indefinite nature of this, asking
to be informed with more specificity before Plaintiff
actually surrendered possession.
Moreover,
Defendant asked Plaintiff to "discontinue"
discounting his rent payment, which strongly
indicates that Defendant expected Plaintiff to remain
in the house, thus requiring more rent payments.

[1] Although notice had been given that
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Plaintiff planned to leave the leased premises
at some indeterminate time after Christmas,
the Court concludes for two reasons that the
lease had not terminated. First, Defendant
had asked Plaintiff to inform him before
Plaintiff left the property and no such
notification was given, indicating that
Plaintiff, who appeared punctilious about such
matters, given the tone of the first notification
letter, was not yet ready to surrender
possession. Second, although Plaintiff was
apparently in the process of moving out on
January 27, he had not moved out.
[2] Although neither party has cited any
Puerto Rican law of abandonment, the Court
is satisfied that abandonment of a leasehold in
Puerto Rico, as elsewhere, requires both the
act and intention of relinquishing the
premises absolutely. Black's Law Dictionary
(5th ed.), at 2.
Plaintiffs and David
Loperena's testimony and the presence of a
significant quantity of Plaintiffs belongings
in the house make clear that on January 27
Plaintiff had not abandoned the leased
premises, for he had not intended at that point
to relinquish the premises absolutely.
Defendant had an obligation under the
Puerto Rican Civil Code "to maintain the
lessee in the peaceful enjoyment of the lease
during all the time of the contract." 31
L.P.R.A. § 4051. If Defendant believed *128
that Plaintiff had breached the lease, had not
paid the rent or was not taking care of the
property, he had legal recourse. Article 1459
of the Puerto Rican Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. §
4066, provides a forcible entry and detainer
action by which Defendant could have sought
to oust Plaintiff. Article 370 of the Civil Code,
31 L.P.R.A. § 1444, also states specifically
that "[i]n no case can possession be forcibly
acquired so long as a possessor is opposed
thereto. Any person who believes that he has
aflight or action to deprive another of the
holding of a thing, shall petition the
assistance of the competent authorities,
provided the holder refuses to deliver up the
said thing."
[3] By locking Plaintiff out of the leasehold
on January 27, Defendant breached both his
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obligation to maintain Plaintiff in the
peaceful enjoyment of the leasehold and his
obligation not to deprive Plaintiff of the
leasehold without the assistance of law.
Defendant is thus responsible to Plaintiff for
any harm caused to him by the disturbance.
Goenaga v. West Indies Trading Corp., 88
P.R.R. 847 (1963).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not
adequately proved that he sustained any
damages when he was excluded from the
leasehold by Defendant. Although Plaintiff
testified that he was still living at the
Canovanillas house when Defendant changed
the lock, the Court disbelieves that testimony.
When Defendant arrived, a close neighbor,
Mrs. Loperena, told him that she had not seen
Plaintiff for a few days. His bed was no longer
on the premises.
Moreover, Defendant
testified convincingly that he had gone to the
house in the middle of the night and in the
early morning of January 27th, finding
Plaintiffs car gone both times and being
unable to rouse anyone on the premises. The
Court finds it more likely than not, therefore,
that Plaintiff was, as David Loperena testified
he told Defendant, in the process of moving
out and that he was not staying in the house.
Although Plaintiff was wrongfully excluded
from the property while the leasehold was still
in effect, the Court cannot find that he
incurred the damages he claims for having to
find a more expensive furnished apartment
quickly and for extra expenses for himself and
his son due to the distance of the new lodgings
from their activities. Clearly, Plaintiff had
been planning to move out since November.
Plaintiff also testified that if Defendant had
waited a few more days, Plaintiff would have
been out. These facts, coupled with the fact
that Plaintiff was apparently moving and not
still staying in the house, lead the Court to
believe that Plaintiff had made prior
arrangements, contrary to his testimony.
Again, Plaintiff failed to provide corroborative
evidence which might have made his claim
more credible. Plaintiff has not submitted
evidence from which the Court might
determine damages caused by Plaintiffs loss
of use of the property he had left in the house
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between the date he was locked out in
January 1988 and the date on which he was
able to reclaim the property in April 1988.
[43 As discussed above, although Plaintiff
has made claims to be reimbursed for money
he spent on alterations to Defendant's house
the Court finds no clear agreement under
which Defendant is obligated to pay. Clearly,
since the expenditures occurred prior to
execution of the written lease, that document
cannot provide the basis for Defendant's
obligation to pay. Plaintiff testified that there
were verbal agreements between Defendant
and David Loperena and Norberto Rohena and
himself concerning the repairs to be made to
Defendant's house, but the Court has not
heard testimony concerning the nature of all
of these agreements. Plaintiff testified that
the repairs on Defendant's house were to be
performed by Rohena in return for money
Rohena owed Plaintiff.
Plaintiff has not
testified to any undertaking by Defendant to
pay for the expenses incurred by Plaintiff.
"Unless damages actually exist and are
sufficiently proved, there can be no
compensation, since Puerto Rico law does not
sanction punitive damages." Riofrio Anda v.
Ralston Purina Co., 772 F.Supp. 46, 52
(D.P.R.1991). Even if Defendant in *129 this
case were voider some duty to pay Plaintiff for
his expenditures, Plaintiff has not submitted
adequate proof of how much he spent on the
repairs. Specifically, Plaintiff testified that he
spent close to or over $1000 for a medicine
cabinet and materials purchased by David
Loperena for the repairs. There was no
breakdown of the expenditures provided.
David Loperena testified, however, that
Plaintiff paid $1500 for the improvements,
again with no itemization of the costs.
Defendant testified that Plaintiff might have
paid $48 for certain lumber for the project. On
this record, the Court could Hot reach any
determination of Plaintiffs out of pocket
expenses.
[5] Plaintiff has further alleged that
Defendant was negligent in his care of
Plaintiffs belongings on the property, and he
claims damages for the loss, through this
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alleged negligence, of the emerald and $2500
or $3000 in cash. As discussed above, Plaintiff
has not met his burden of showing that he had
an emerald and a large amount of cash on the
premises when Defendant locked him out.
Therefore, even if Defendant had been shown
to be negligent, which he has not, Plaintiff has
not proven the damages which he seeks.
[6] Finally, Plaintiff claims that he has
suffered severe mental anguish because
Defendant locked him out of the rented
property. As the Court said in Riofrio Anda v.
Ralston Purina Co., 772 F.Supp. at 53:
"Although Puerto Rico recognizes moral
damages for breach of contract, ... moral
damages for emotional distress will not be
awarded unless evidence establishes that the
mental condition of the claimant has been
considerably affected."
As the court also
noted, even under the more liberal standard
for awarding such damages under Puerto
Rican tort law, there must still be "a showing
that in 'some appreciable measure the health,
welfare and happiness of the claimant were
really affected.' " The Court finds that the
proof here does not meet either standard.
Plaintiff testified that finding himself locked
out of his house, he was terribly anguished
and in a state of nerves, and his blood pressure
became and remained high. The Court does
not
accept
Plaintiffs
uncorroborated
testimony as proving 1) that his blood pressure
increased at the time of the lockout, and 2)
that the increase was caused by Defendant's
conduct. Plaintiff is not a physician, and he
did not testify to having visited a physician. If
Plaintiff's statement was intended not to
prove medical fact but to be merely
colloquially descriptive of his state of distress,
the Court did not find it very persuasive. The
testimony was delivered in a perfunctory
manner and the Court was not left with the
belief that Plaintiff had been considerably
affected. The Court has found that Plaintiff
was not staying in the house at the time he
found himself locked out and that he had left
his belongings there until he could move
them.
Thus, being locked out merely
continued a situation which Plaintiff had
begun and was not likely to have caused
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terrible anguish. David Loperena testified
that Plaintiff was very worried because all of
his property was in the house. Plaintiff,
however, immediately acted on his worry by
instituting legal proceedings, which seemed
likely to get his belongings back shortly.
Other testimony, by Plaintiff and Edwin
Castro [FN8], indicated that Plaintiff was in
mental distress because of the alleged threats
by Defendant. As previously stated, the Court
finds that Plaintiff was not as distressed by
the threats as he has testified. On the basis of
the record before it, the Court finds that
Defendant did interfere with Plaintiffs
peaceful enjoyment of *130 his leasehold and
that Plaintiff did suffer some slight mental
anguish because of being prevented from
entering his house. The Court does not find,
however, that this mental distress was
significant enough to warrant an award of
damages.
FN8. Edwin Castro's testimony was not particularly
credible in its entirety because he seemed to be
reciting events by rote without having a real
memory of them. His memory of dates of certain
events does not coincide with that of any of the
other witnesses, and when he was pressed his story
became much more confused. In any event, Castro
testified that as he and Plaintiff were driving, they
were flagged down by Defendant and Plaintiff did
not want to stop because he was fearful. Plaintiff
did stop, however, and engage in conversation with
Defendant, leading the Court to believe that even if
Castro were telling the truth about Plaintiffs state
of mind, Plaintiff was not so fearful that his anxiety
affected him in any considerable manner.

B. Counterclaims
Defendant has filed a counterclaim in this
suit seeking payment of rent. The record
shows clearly that Plaintiff paid $300 at the
inception of the lease for the first month's rent
and a security deposit. Plaintiff also sent
Defendant a check for $125 for the second
month's rent, representing the second monthly
payment minus $25 for cutting the grass.
Defendant informed Plaintiff that he should
"discontinue" this reduction in the rent,
because he does "not agree with that
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discount." The Court finds that Defendant by
the terms of his reply letter accepted the
reduced payment for the second monthly
payment, but indicated that he did not agree
to it for future payments. The Court bases
this finding both on Defendant's use of the
word "discontinue" and on his failure to
request that Plaintiff pay him the deducted
$25. The Court finds, therefore, that taking
into account the security deposit, Defendant
had received the equivalent of three months
rent, which would have covered Plaintiffs
occupancy through mid-January. [FN9]
FN9. Plaintiff testified that in October he loaned
Defendant another $300 to buy airline tickets to
New York and that Defendant said to deduct that
amount from the rent.
David Loperena also
testified to the loan, but he placed the date in
February. The Court does not believe that such a
loan and agreement took place. First, if Plaintiff
had made such a loan in October, to be credited to
rent, he would have been unlikely then to have
remitted the November rent for it would have been
paid by the credit. The Court does not believe that
the loan occurred in February because Plaintiff and
Defendant were on very bad terms at that point and
it would not have been contemplated by either party
that Plaintiff would continue to stay in the house
and pay rent against which the loan could be
credited.

[7] Under the terms of the lease and the civil
code, 31 L.P.R.A. § 4052, Plaintiff was
obligated to continue paying rent as long as he
remained in possession, and he was in arrears
as of the time of Defendant's arrival. He
clearly was not obligated, however, to pay rent
for the period after he was excluded from the
property. Taking into account the rent and
security deposit paid by Plaintiff, the Court
finds, therefore, that Plaintiff owes Defendant
$60 for rent for the period between January
15th and 27th, during which he was in
possession. Defendant is not entitled to collect
rent for the period after January 27, 1988
during which Plaintiff was seeking through
the legal process to regain access to the
property.
[8] Defendant also seeks $1000 for damages
to the house caused by Plaintiffs negligence
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and failure to maintain the property in good
condition. Under the lease itself and under
the Puerto Rican Civil Code, the lessee has a
duty to use the leasehold as would a diligent
father of a family. 31 L.P.R.A. § 4052. The
Code also makes the lessee liable for the
deterioration suffered by the thing leased,
unless he proves that it took place without his
fault. 31 L.P.R.A. § 4060; see Cabinero v.
Cobian; Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 81 P.R.R. 926
(1960). The Court has found that Plaintiff left
the house dirty and that his lack of care had
caused it to become infested.
Defendant
testified that he spent about $700 for an
exterminator's
services.
Plaintiff
is
responsible for this expense.
Although Defendant testified that Plaintiff
had ruined the stove, the Court cannot award
the $300 damages Defendant seeks for having
replaced it. First, although the photographs of
the stove show a degraded kitchen appliance,
as described above, the Court cannot have
complete confidence in the photographs as
showing the condition of the stove when
Defendant arrived. If the photographs are
accurate, it seems very unlikely that the stove
could have been in perfect condition and
arrived in such a state in the three months of
Plaintiffs tenancy. In the pictures it appears
very rusty and old looking as well as dirty.
David Loperena's testimony confirms this
observation.
He stated, and the Court
believes his testimony over that of Defendant
on this point, that when Plaintiff moved in
*131 there was an old, run down stove in the
house with only two working burners.
Although Defendant testified to the stove
being dirty and encrusted with grease, that in
itself would not require its replacement. The
Court cannot find, therefore, that the stove,
was ruined during Plaintiff's tenancy so that
it required replacement.
Defendant also testified that he had to
replace cranks on the windows in the house.
Defendant could not recall how many cranks
he replaced, but he estimated that he replaced
ten at $10 apiece. There was no testimony
that all the cranks were in working order
when Plaintiff entered the leasehold, and
given the photo showing damage to one crank,
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the Court finds it unlikely that Plaintiff broke
ten in the course of a three month tenancy.
The Court is not satisfied from the evidence
before it that ten window cranks worth $100
were destroyed during Plaintiffs tenancy.
Defendant also testified that he bought grass
seed to reseed the lawn. He did not testify
how much it cost, so he has not proved that
element of damage. Also, while Defendant
testified that he did most of the work required
to put the house back in proper condition,
there is no evidence from which the Court
might translate this testimony into a damages
award.
[9] Defendant's third counterclaim seeks
attorney's fees under a clause in the contract
requiring Plaintiff to pay reasonable expenses
arising out of a legal action due to a breach of
contract. Defendant presented no evidence on
this claim and has not addressed it in his
brief. The issue is, therefore, waived. Collins
v. Marina-Martinez, 894 F.2d 474, 481 n. 9
(1st Cir.1990) ( "It is settled beyond
peradventure that issues mentioned in a
perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by any
effort at developed argumentation are deemed
waived.")
[10] Defendant also seeks $200,000 for
mental anguish and emotional distress caused
by Plaintiff's lawsuit and the destruction of
Defendant's property. Although the Court has
found no damages for Plaintiff, it did find that
Defendant had wrongfully interfered with
Plaintiff's
peaceful
enjoyment
of
the
leasehold. The suit is, therefore, not frivolous.
The asserted "destruction" of Defendant's
property has turned out to be merely that
Plaintiff left the house dirty, a condition
remediable by Defendant in a few days. The
Court is not persuaded by Defendant's
testimony that because he was very
"disappointed" and angry at the condition of
his "dream" house, his mental condition has
been considerably affected or that in " 'some
appreciable measure the health, welfare and
happiness of the claimant were really
affected.' " Riofrio Anda v. Ralston Purina
Co., 772 F.Supp. at 53. Since Defendant was
willing to rent the house in the first place, his

Copr. e West 1996 No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works
l?iVJS£IIIR\?i?«

788 F.Supp. 122
(Cite as: 788 F.Supp. 122, *131)
tie to it could not have been such that he could
not bear any change in its condition.
Moreover, since he required a security deposit,
he must have contemplated and accepted the
possibility of an outcome of the rental
situation similar to that which occurred.
Defendant has not made a showing of mental
distress adequate to require compensation in
damages.
[11] Finally, Defendant has not presented
evidence or argument on his counterclaim for
slander.
That counterclaim is therefore
deemed waived. Collins v. Marina-Martinez,
894 F.2d at 481 n. 9.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is
liable to Defendant in the amount of $760 for
unpaid rent and for his failure to care for
Defendant's property as required by law.
SO ORDERED.
END OF DOCUMENT
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